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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Larry Corwin appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for felony
driving under the influence, along with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
On appeal, he asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing
arguments, and that this misconduct rose to the level of a fundamental error.
Accordingly, Mr. Corwin asserts that his judgment of conviction and sentence should be
vacated in light of the fact that this misconduct deprived him of his due process rights to
fairness in his trial proceedings and because this error was not harmless.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Larry Dean Corwin was originally charged with felony driving under the influence,
with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement, and was convicted following a jury
trial. (35305 R.1, pp.26-27, 36-38, 74-77.) During the pendency of his appeal, his case
was remanded back to district court by stipulation of the parties for a new trial. (35305
Order to Vacate Judgment; Remand for New Trial and Dismiss Appeal With Prejudice,
entered on November 4, 2009.)
Following remand, the State filed an amended information charging Mr. Corwin
with felony driving under the influence.

(R., pp.42-43.)

This information alleged as

alternate bases for the felony enhancement that Mr. Corwin had previously been
convicted of felony driving under the influence (DUI) within 15 years of his present

1

The Idaho Supreme Court has ordered that the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's
Record from Mr. Corwin's prior appeal in this case be augmented into the record
through its Order Augmenting Appeal in this case. (R., p.2.)
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alleged offense and/or that he had two prior DUI convictions within the previous 1O
years. (R., pp.42-43.)
At trial, the State presented only one witness: Officer Darrell Meacham of the
Ada County Sheriff's Office.

(Tr. 2 , p.173, Ls.8-13.)

The officer testified that he had

been trained in how to perform field sobriety tests and also in how to use breath testing
equipment for purposes of determining whether an individual is driving under the
influence. (Tr., p.175, L.23 - p.176, L.3.) After explaining to the jury the process of
administering field sobriety tests, Officer Meacham turned to the night that Mr. Corwin
was alleged to have been driving under the influence. (Tr., p.178, L.8 - p.187, L.24.)
Officer Meacham was the officer who had originally pulled Mr. Corwin over.
(Tr., p.187, L.20 - p.188, L.23.) According to his testimony, there was only one aspect
of Mr. Corwin's driving pattern that aroused the officer's suspicions: Mr. Corwin
allegedly failed to dim his high beams on the truck he was driving as he passed the
officer's vehicle.

(Tr., p.188, Ls.16-23.) The officer then turned his car around and

began to follow the truck Mr. Corwin was driving. (Tr., p.189, L.16 - p.191, L.6.)
Mr. Corwin had no observable driving impairment while the officer was following
him: he did not execute any turns too widely, follow any other cars too closely, signal
inconsistently with his drivi11g actions, cross over any traffic lanes, fail to signal, swerve,
or make any abrupt turns. (Tr., p.245, L.5 - p.247, L.3.) The officer specifically testified
that, during the time he was following Mr. Corwin's car, he did not notice anything else
regarding his driving pattern that aroused his suspicions. (Tr., p.243, Ls.15-18.) The
only other thing that Officer Meacham thought was odd was that Mr. Corwin pulled his

2

Unless otherwise indicated, citations herein to the transcript refer to the primary
volume of transcripts of the proceedings that includes Mr. Corwin's trial and sentencing.
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truck into a subdivision that was not yet occupied, as all of the houses were still under
construction. (Tr., p.190, L.23 - p.191, L.6.) Officer Meacham testified that he pulled
Mr. Corwin over at this housing subdivision.

(Tr., p.192, Ls.7-17.)

Mr. Corwin also

responded immediately when the officer signaled him to pull over and did not give any
indication of attempting to elude the officer. (Tr., p.248, Ls.8-17.)
In talking to Mr. Corwin, Officer Meacham testified that Mr. Corwin's eyes were,
"bloodshot and glassy," and that Mr. Corwin had slurred speech. (Tr., p.198, Ls.4-11.)
He further testified that these were "the kinds of things [law enforcement officers] look
for in intoxicated people." (Tr., p.198, Ls.16-19.) However, the officer also admitted
that he was not familiar with Mr. Corwin's normal speech patterns and whether his
speech on the evening in question was different than Mr. Corwin's normal mode of
speaking. (Tr., p.251, L.11 - p.252, L.3.) When Mr. Corwin got out of the truck at the
officer's request, Officer Meacham testified that he smelled the odor of alcohol coming
from him. (Tr., p.199, L.25 - p.200, L.4.) At this time, Mr. Corwin denied having had
anything to drink. (Tr., p.200, Ls.5-15.)
According to his testimony, Officer Meacham did not see Mr. Corwin fall over,
stumble, or lean on the truck in order to balance himself. (Tr., p.255, L.20 - p.256, L.2.)
The officer had Mr. Corwin perform three field sobriety tests: the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test, the "walk and turn" test, and the "one-leg stand" test. (Tr., p.201, L.14
- p.209, L.12.) Regarding Mr. Corwin's performance on the walk and turn test, Officer
Meacham testified that Mr. Corwin appeared to be swaying, missed several heel-to-toe
maneuvers, was not walking in a straight line, raised his arms, and spun around to turn
around rather than taking several small steps as instructed.

(Tr., p.206, Ls.18-14.)

Officer Meacham also acknowledged that there was no physical "line" for Mr. Corwin to
3

follow for purposes of the walk and turn test - a test that measures, in part, whether an
individual can walk heel-to-toe in a straight line - even though the officer used
Mr. Corwin's failure to walk along this imaginary line as part of his basis in findi17g that
Mr. Corwin failed this test. (Tr., p.183, L.15- p.184, L.23, p.267, L.21 - p.268, L.12.)
Officer Meacham similarly testified that Mr. Corwin did not pass the other two
field sobriety tests that were administered. (Tr., p.201, L.20 - p.209, L.6.) When asked
by the officer as to how he thought he did on the tests, Mr. Corwin allegedly said that he
failed them, but also explained that his performance was probably the result of his being
tired.

(Tr., p.209, Ls.13-25.)

Based upon Mr. Garwin's performance on the field

sobriety tests, Officer Meacham testified as to his belief that Mr. Corwin was under the
influence of alcohol. (Tr., p.210, Ls.8-13.)
Given his assessment, Officer Meacham then arrested Mr. Corwin for driving
under the influence of alcohol and transported him to the Ada County Jail. (Tr., p.210,
L.20 - p.213, L.3.)

Prior to transporting him, the officer searched the truck that

Mr. Corwin was driving and found a bottle of vodka under the passenger seat that was
one quarter full, along with a glass of soda mixed with what Officer Meacham believed
was alcohol. (Tr., p.212, Ls.10-15.) It was Officer Meacham's belief that the bottle of
vodka and the mixed drink actually belonged to the passenger in Mr. Corwin's truck,
Sunday Bender, rather than Mr. Corwin. 3 (Tr., p.285, L.5 - p.286, L.11.)
When Mr. Corwin performed the alcohol breath test, the results came back as
0.083 and 0.085 - above the legal limit of 0.08.

(Tr., p.233, L.15 - p.234, L.4.)

However, according to the officer, this test was not administered until approximately two

3

Ms. Bender is referred to alternately in the proceedings as "Sunday Bender," "Nancy
Bender," "Sunday Corwin," and "Nancy Corwin."
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hours and fifteen minutes after Mr. Corwin was initially pulled over. (Tr., p.237, L.25 p.238, L.13.) Officer Meacham also admitted that, among the factors that can affect the
reliability of this test is the passage of time so that Mr. Corwin's breath alcohol
concentration could vary overtime. (Tr., p.282, Ls.1-7.)
The State rested following Officer Meacham's testimony. (Tr., p.291, L.20.)
Mr. Corwin likewise presented one witness at trial - Tammy Cecil. (Tr., p.298,
L.16 - p.299, L.6.) Ms. Cecil was a friend and co-worker of Mr. Corwin's who was also
with him for the entire day and much of the evening of his alleged DUI. (Tr., p.300, L.6
- p.306, L.3.)

Mr. Corwin, Ms. Bender and Ms. Cecil were also living in the same

residence at that time. (Tr., p.302, Ls.16-19.) Being familiar with Mr. Corwin, Ms. Cecil
informed the jury that he had a slurred pattern of speech attributable to his southern
accent and to the fact that Mr. Corwin had dental issues that affected his speaking.
(Tr., p.299, L.11 - p.300, L.1.)
That day, Ms. Cecil, Ms. Bender, and Mr. Corwin were all doing landscaping
work at a residence from early in the morning until it began to get dark. (Tr., p.300, L.6
- p.301, L.10.) According to Ms. Cecil's testimony, Mr. Corwin was engaged in physical
labor that day, and further had to unload debris from the truck even after the work day
ended. (Tr., p.301, L.11 - p.303, L.1.)
That evening, after Mr. Corwin unloaded the truck, the three ate dinner and
began to watch a movie when Mr. Corwin was called by a friend whose truck had
broken down. (Tr., p.303, L.6 - p.304, L.25.) Mr. Corwin and Ms. Bender then left to go
help this friend with his truck. (Tr., p.305, L.1 - p.306, L.34.) Ms. Cecil testified that
Mr. Corwin had not been drinking at all to her knowledge prior to leaving the house to
go help his friend. (Tr., p.303, L.19 - p.304, L.4.)
5

During closing arguments, Mr. Corwin noted with regard to his performance on
the walk-and-turn field sobriety test that there was no actual, observable line that he
could have used as a guide when performing this test. (Tr., p.357, Ls.2-10.) He then
argued that it was possible that Officer Meacham's assessment that he had not been
walking in a straight line could have been the product of "the human element" - i.e., that
whether Mr. Corwin was walking a straight line could have been an issue of a difference
of perspective between Mr. Corwin and the officer. (Tr., p.357, Ls.2-10.)
Thereafter, in closing argument, the prosecutor made the following remarks:
[Trial counsel] said -- I think I wrote this down right -- Mr. Corwin was
walking straight from his perspective, but not from the officer's
perspective. Even with all the evidence in this case, I'm glad we're looking
at this from the officer's perspective. From Mr. Corwin's perspective, if
that was a straight line, then we're all in trouble because he had to -- when
he fell off line, which is exactly what we're talking about at that point, when
he stepped off line by a foot, he did so to stop himself from falling over.
So the line from his point of view was crooked and careening down to the
ground. That's -- that's not the type of line we want a driver to follow.
(Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17.)
The jury convicted Mr. Corwin of driving under the influence. (Tr., p.382, Ls.1-4;
R., p.140.) Additionally, the jury found that Mr. Corwin was eligible for both of the felony

enhancements alleged by the State - i.e., that he had been convicted of DUI on at least
two prior occasions within the previous ten years and that, within the prior 15 years of
the alleged offense, he had been convicted of felony DUI. (Tr., p.419, L.23 - p.420,
L.15; R., p.141.) Finally, the jury found that Mr. Corwin was a persistent violator of the
law, and was therefore subject to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
(Tr., p.432, Ls.13-19; R., p.142.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Corwin to 20 years, with 10 years fixed, upon his
conviction for felony DUI along with the persistent violator sentencing enhancement
6

(R., pp.186-189.) Thereafter, Mr. Corwin filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion
seeking a reduction of his sentence.

(Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence,

augment; Addendum to Defendant's Motion Pursuant to ICR 35, augment.) The district
court subsequently granted Mr. Corwin's request for a reduction of his sentence in part.
(Memorandum Decision Reconsidering Defendant's Sentence, augment.) Specifically,
the court reduced the fixed term of Mr. Corwin's sentence by five years while keeping
his aggregate sentence at thirty years, resulting in an underlying sentence of 30 years,
with five years fixed.

(Memorandum Decision Reconsidering Defendant's Sentence,

augment.)
Mr. Corwin timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence.
(R., p.191.)

7

ISSUE
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, during
closing arguments when the prosecutor mischaracterized Mr. Corwin's arguments,
appealed to the passion and prejudice of the jury, and misstated the law regarding the
jury's right to determine all facts relevant to the issues at trial?

8

ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error,
During Closing Arguments When The Prosecutor Mischaracterized Mr. Corwin's
Arguments, Appealed To The Passion And Prejudice Of The Jury, And Misstated The
Law Regarding The Jury's Right To Determine All Facts Relevant To The Issues At Trial

A.

Introduction
Mr. Corwin asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing

arguments,

rising to the

level of a fundamental error, when the prosecutor

mischaracterized Mr. Corwin's arguments at trial, misstated the law, and appealed to
the passions and prejudice of the jurors.

B.

Standard Of Review
In cases where the defendant fails to object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial,

this Court will review the alleged error for whether the misconduct alleged rises to the
level of a fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). In cases of
unobjected to error, this Court applies a three-step process of review.

First, the

defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights were violated.

Id.

Second, the error must be clear and obvious

from the record without the need of additional information not contained within the
record on appeal.

Id.

Finally, the defendant must show that the error affected the

defendant's substantial rights.

Id. As to this last prong, the defendant must show a

reasonable possibility that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial.

9

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct. Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental
Error, During Closing Arguments In This Case
During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following statement

regarding Mr. Corwin's performance during one of the field sobriety tests administered
by Officer Meacham prior to Mr. Corwin's arrest:
[Trial counsel] said -- I think I wrote this down right -- Mr. Corwin was
walking straight from his perspective, but not from the officer's
perspective. Even with all the evidence in this case, I'm glad we're looking
at this from the officer's perspective. From Mr. Corwin's perspective, if
that was a straight line, then we're all in trouble because he had to -- when
he fell off line, which is exactly what we're talking about at that point, when
he stepped off line by a foot, he did so to stop himself from falling over.
So the line from his point of view was crooked and careening down to the
ground. That's -- that's not the type of line we want a driver to follow.
(Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17.)
This argument by the prosecutor was improper, and violated Mr. Corwin's
constitutional right to due process and to a jury determination on the facts in three ways.
First, the prosecutor in this case misstated Mr. Corwin's actual arguments in his
defense. The prosecutor implied that Mr. Corwin was arguing to the jury that they had
to defer to his personal assessment of his performance during the field sobriety tests in
weighing the evidence of whether Mr. Corwin was intoxicated.

However, this is not

what Mr. Corwin argued.
During closing arguments, Mr. Corwin noted that the evidence at trial showed
that there was no observable "line," such as a fog line or a chalk line, that Mr. Corwin
could have used as an objective measure when performing the walk-and-turn test.
(Tr., p.356, L.23 - p.357, L.14.) In absence of such a line, Mr. Corwin argued that the
human element could have played a role in the officer's assessment of Mr. Corwin's
performance on this test - i.e., that it could have been a matter of the officer's subjective
perspective while observing Mr. Corwin that he was not walking along a straight line.
10

(Tr., p.356, L.23 - p.357, L.14.} Mr. Corwin specifically argued that this was a factor
that the jury should weigh in determining the reliability of Mr. Corwin's purported
performance on this test. (Tr., p.357, Ls.3-14.) Mr. Corwin never argued that his own
subjective assessment should control the jury's determination as to whether Mr. Corwin
showed indications of intoxication.
Among the protections of the due process clause is the guarantee of the right of
a criminal defendant to fairly present his defense at trial. See, e.g., State v. Marlin, 146
Idaho 357, 361 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985)).
This right to due process may be violated where a prosecutor mischaracterizes the
defendant's arguments at trial, particularly when this mischaracterization is linked to a
subsequent appeal to the passion or prejudice of the jury. State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho
904, 909-10 (2010}. Immediately after implying that Mr. Corwin had argued that the jury
should view the walk-and-turn solely from his perspective, the State asserted to the jury
that, "we're all in trouble," if they believed Mr. Corwin's argument. (Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17.)
As such, the prosecutor not only mischaracterized what Mr. Corwin had argued to the
jury, but also injected an appeal to the jury's fears if they accepted the State's
characterization of Mr. Corwin's defense.

In doing so, the prosecutor violated

Mr. Corwin's due process right to a fair trial.
Second, as was noted, the prosecutor injected an impermissible appeal to the
passions and prejudice of the jurors into his closing argument, and this also violated
Mr. Corwin's right to a fair trial. After mischaracterizing Mr. Corwin's arguments in his
defense, the prosecutor then cautioned the jury that "we're all in trouble," if the jury were
to credit what the prosecutor attributed as Mr. Corwin's defense. (Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17.)
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This argument was intended to play on the fears of the jurors were they to acquit
Mr. Corwin of the State's charges, and was plainly imp roper.
It is so well-established as to be axiomatic that it is improper for a prosecutor to
appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury, or to appeal to the emotions of the
jurors, in an attempt to seek a conviction. See, e.g., Perry, 150 Idaho at 227; State v.
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 266 (2010); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20-21 (Ct. App.

2008); State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 575 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho
651, 656-657 (Ct. App. 1984). Such appeals include arguments by the prosecutor that
seek to secure a conviction through arguing that a conviction is necessary to prevent
future crimes or to protect the public at large. Beebe, 145 Idaho at 575; Baruth, 107
Idaho at 656-657. "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other
than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial,
including reasonable inferences from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
The prosecutor in this case made just such an improper appeal to the jurors. In
miscasting Mr. Garwin's arguments as an assertion that the jurors should view his
performance on one of the field sobriety tests solely from his point of view, the
prosecutor thereafter cautioned the jury that, "we're all in trouble," if they did so.
(Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17.) Just as in Troutman, this was an improper appeal to the emotions
of the jury that was tied to a misstatement of Mr. Corwin's arguments. And, just as in
Troutman, this violated Mr. Corwin's constitutional right to a fair trial.

Finally, the prosecutor in this case impliedly argued to the jury that they were
required to defer to Officer Meacham's assessment of Mr. Corwin's performance on the
field sobriety test, rather than to weigh the import of this evidence on their own. In doing
12

so, the prosecutor misstated the law as to the jury's right to make its own independent
assessment of the evidence at trial. During closing arguments, the prosecution stated to
the jury with regard to how to evaluate Mr. Corwin's performance on the field sobriety
tests that, "I'm glad we're looking at this from the officer's perspective." (Tr., p.370,
Ls.4-17.) The prosecutor's remarks were directed at the jurors - and this statement
was in relation to how these jurors were to evaluate the evidence of Mr. Corwin's
performance on the field sobriety tests.

In implying that the jury was required to

measure and view Mr. Corwin's performance on the field sobriety tests from the
perspective of Officer Meacham, the prosecutor misstated the law in a manner that
deprived Mr. Corwin of his right to due process and to a jury determination as to the
material facts.
It is well-established in Idaho that it is the sole province and function of the jury to
determine the credibility of the evidence, and assign whatever weight or significance to
that evidence as the jury deems appropriate. See, e.g., Perry, 150 Idaho at 229. In
doing so, it is the jury's province to determine what weight, if any, to give to the
testimony of any witness. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007). In fact,
it is the right of the jury to make these determinations independently.

See, e.g.,

State v. Daniels, 134 Idaho 896, 898 (2000); State v. Button, 134 Idaho 864, 869

(Ct. App. 2000); State v. Aguilar, 103 Idaho 578, 590 (1982).
Given the plain state of the law, which accords only the jury the right to make a
determination as to the credibility of the witnesses, it is a misstatement of the law for the
State to assert that the power to assess the weight or import of the evidence belongs
instead to any particular witness for the State or to any other party to the proceedings.
See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that closing

13

argument should

not

include

opinions

about

credibility of the witnesses

or

misstatements of the applicable law). And a prosecutor's misstatement of the law in
seeking to obtain a conviction can rise to the level of a due process violation. Perry,
150 Idaho at 227.
Each of these errors are plain from the face of the appellate record and were not
the result of any tactical decision on the part of trial counsel in failing to object.
Mr. Corwin received no strategic benefit from the prosecutor seeking to induce the jury
to

decide

his

guilt

or

innocence

based

upon

misstatements

of

the

law,

mischaracterizations of his defense, or appeals to the jurors' emotions.
And there is a reasonable possibility that each of these instances of prosecutorial
misconduct may have contributed to the jury's verdict. First, this portion of the State's
argument came during its rebuttal, which has been held to be an important factor in the
determination of harmless error.

Troutman, 148 Idaho at 909-910. As noted by the

Troutman court, "It is also important to note that this misconduct by the prosecutor

occurred in rebuttal argument. At this point in the trial the state has the last word and is
in a position to leave a lasting impression on the jury." Troutman, 148 Idaho at 909-910.
Here, as in Troutman, the prosecutor's improper remarks came at a time when
the state had the last word on the evidence, and on how the jury should render their
decision in Mr. Corwin's case.

Because this misconduct urged the jury to render its

verdict based upon facts outside the evidence, as well as misstatements of the law, this
final word left the jury with the lasting impression that they should extend their
deliberations to considerations that were improper.
Moreover, the strength of the State's overall evidence in this case was not
overwhelming. Although the State presented evidence of Mr. Corwin's breath test for
14

alcohol that registered amounts above the legal limit, his results were only 0.083 and
0.085. (Tr., p.233, L.15 - p.234, L.4.) In addition, this test was not administered until
approximately two hours and fifteen minutes after Mr. Corwin was initially pulled over;
and Officer Meacham testified that a person's breath alcohol concentration varies over
the passage of time. (Tr., p.237, L.25-p.238, L.13, p.282, Ls.1-7.)
Additionally, Mr. Corwin exhibited no pattern of actual impairment in his driving
other than his failure to dim his high beams when passing the officer. (Tr., p.188, Ls.1623; p.243, L.15 - p.247, L.3.)

In the absence of any other significant showing that

Mr. Corwin's ability to drive was actually impaired, Officer Meacham's testimony
regarding Mr. Corwin's performance on the field sobriety tests was critical to the jury's
overall assessment of the evidence. Because the misconduct in this case related to this
issue, and because Mr. Corwin raised several doubts during cross-examination
regarding the officer's assessment of his performance on the field sobriety tests, there is
a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's misconduct in this case contributed to the
jury's verdict

Accordingly, the misconduct in this case rises to the level of a

fundamental error requiring reversal of Mr. Corwin's judgment of conviction for driving
under the influence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Corwin respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgment of
conviction and sentence, and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of March, 2011.

/L/··J
SARAH E. TOMPKINS v
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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